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Globalisation, Regionalisation And The Making Of Social Policy In South Eastern Europe.

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The Making of Social Policy In South Eastern Europe:
Theories, Methods, Politics

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http://www.gaspp.org
I. Introduction.

‘Global Social Policy’
Preparing this paper is like coming full circle. From 1995 to 1997 we collaborated on a study of post-communist social policy in Hungary, the Ukraine, Bulgaria, and the post-Yugoslav countries. The results came to be published as what we believe was the first text that articulated the idea of a ‘global social policy’ and the first text that focused primarily on the relationship between globalisation and social policy (Deacon, Hulse and Stubbs 1997). Since then, theories and approaches to the study of social policy, in the context of globalisation, some of which challenge the central defining features of the subject, and others some of the apparent methodological certainties upon which ‘Global Social Policy’ was based, have developed apace. In the context of our current work on South Eastern Europe, then, we have an opportunity to revisit the broad themes of sections of that book, placing more explicit emphasis on the theoretical, methodological and political underpinnings of, and dilemmas in, our work both separately and together.

It is also the case that, since the publication of our book, texts on globalisation and social policy or globalisation and welfare states have multiplied (cf. inter alia Mishra 1999, Yeates 2001, Sykes 2001, George and Wilding 2002, and Swank 2002). The possible threats that the globalisation of the economy within a neo-liberal policy framework might represent for established universal, high-state-spending, welfare states of the European kind has been the focus of these subsequent books, rather than the post-communist, and also European, welfare states in transition in Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe. Evidence and arguments go both ways and we will return to this shortly. However it is important to remind ourselves of the subtitle of the 1997 book: International Organisations and the Future of Welfare. Our concern then as now was not so much with the impact of the global economy on national social policy but rather with the impact of the politics of globalisation upon national (and also supranational) social policy. It is also important to bear in mind that in the absence of an explicit open political forum where the global politics of welfare could be fought out, still the case today, we argued that it was the debates within and between epistemic communities in and around formal intergovernmental organisations such as the World Bank and the ILO, and the debates between these and emerging international Non-Governmental Organisations, which was shaping the future of welfare policy. We hold to this position, whilst noting the increased complexity of arguments and massive proliferation of actors contributing to contemporary debates.

Our warnings regarding the possibility of globalisation eroding the universalistic welfare states of the European kind, was argued on the following basis:

“The opportunity created by the ‘collapse of communism’ for the global actors to shape the future of social policy has been grasped enthusiastically by the dominant liberal tendency in the World Bank. In alliance with social development NGOs who are being given a part to play especially in zones of instability, a social safety net future is being constructed. This NGO support combined with the political support of many southern and some East European governments is challenging powerfully those defenders of universalistic and social security based welfare states to be found in the EU, the ILO and in smaller numbers in the Bank”. (Deacon et al 1997, p197)
In this argument, it was not as if countries and their institutional and political make up did not matter. How the game played out in different settings was interestingly different as reflected rather provocatively in our subheadings for some of our country stories:

’Hungary: IMF and World Bank call the shots?’ (ibid; p. 104)
’Ukraine: the Bank searches for a counterpart while the ILO and UNDP talk with the old guard?’ (ibid; p. 119)

Our case studies showed that, for example, where the Bank was able to lend support to a reforming Minister of Finance pension reform was more likely, or where the ILO formed an alliance with the Minister of Labour resistance to such reforms was enhanced, and so on.

A similar argument can be found in a recent volume addressing the prospects for pension reform in Europe, where Holzmann, Orenstein and Rutkowski (2003) suggest that it is the combination of World Bank influence and country level actors who together have mobilised radical pension reform where it has taken place:

“When examining the circumstances that enabled pension privatisation ... it turned out that the driving forces of pension privatisation proved to be the neo-liberally minded ministries of finance and economics, backed by the International Financial Institutions’ policy advice and financial support.” (Holzmann, Orenstein and Rutkowski 2003, p. 68).

They go on to conclude more generally:

“In summary, global policy advocates appear to be a major force in the interregional diffusion of policy ideas and would benefit from a careful and systematic analysis of where and how their resources are best employed”. (ibid; p. 190).

This kind of approach to explaining social policy change that privileges the ideas carried by epistemic communities has been given support recently by a number of studies of policy change which focus on the role of ideas. Supporting our claim that ideas matter is the work of Berman (1998) and Blyth (2002) both of whom make the case that the ‘big ideas’ of social democracy and of neo-liberalism lend legitimacy to policy shifts being argued for by social actors. Of course, ideas should not be conceived as free-floating and context-free but neither should we view social welfare reform as fixed and determined by over-arching structures or path dependency. Our open, empirical, approach rather seeks to examine the relationship between different regional, national and local structures, including diverse cultures, confessions and historically specific memories, to the ‘big ideas’ of neo-liberalism, focusing on the ‘what’, the ‘who’, and the ‘how’ of social welfare and its reform.

In this context we are conscious of the critique which one of us made recently of the approach in ‘Global Social Policy’:

“The book … is in danger of an uncritical ‘scaling up’ of some of the narrower foci of mainstream British social policy analysis, obsessed with administrative details; constructing typologies of welfare regimes; and underpinned by a fundamental belief that such analysis, particularly when supported by ‘hard facts’, can and will make things better.” (Stubbs, 2002, p.326).
The other author (Deacon), in contrast, continues explicitly to work within a ‘global Fabian’ approach which seeks to “fill the vacuum between ‘globophiles’ and ‘globaphobes’” based on “the coherent articulation of a genuine alternative rooted in fundamental reform of the rules and institutions that govern global markets” (Jacobs and Lent, 2003; p. 3).

Theorising, Methods, Politics
In retrospect, the disagreement relates to the balance between theory, methodology and politics, in the context of three developments in the study of social policy which are relevant to our work in South Eastern Europe:

1. The cultural turn: The importance of cultural perspectives, emphasised throughout sociology for at least twenty years, came very late to the study of social policy and welfare studies. Stuart Hall describes the pioneering text ‘Welfare and Culture in Europe’ (Chamberlayne et al, eds, 1999) as showing how ‘material policies and practices only “work” and make sense when understood as embedded within distinctive welfare cultures – the wider networks of relationships and shared assumptions, of symbolic meanings and understandings, which characterize different societies” (Chamberlayne et al, eds, 1999, back cover). Of course, the influence of Foucault has long been felt within social policy but, in ‘Welfare and Culture in Europe’, a more nuanced approach is developed which addresses welfare cultures as fluid, generative, and involving real, lived, transactions between welfare regimes and welfare subjects, mediated by professional/power complexes. Whilst there is a tension in the different chapters in the book between structuralist, culturalist and biographical approaches, the approach developed by Caroline Knowles (1999), was particularly influential in some of our recent work (Stubbs, 2002). Her view of welfare regimes and their subjects as ‘composed through the various discourses which converge around them’ (Knowles, 1999, p. 245), and as ‘the product of shifting meanings, priorities and professional responsibilities’ (p. 246), forces attention on ‘the local micro-operations of welfare’ (p. 249) constantly cutting across macro-reform agendas, often in unexpected ways. This would have been a useful corrective to our focus only on the systemic communities of governments and international agencies in ‘Global Social Policy’.

2. New Forms of Criminalisation of the Poor: Heavily reliant on Zygmunt Baumann’s notion of the ‘post-social security state’ (Baumann, 1998), Tony Fitzpatrick has argued recently that, as globalisation processes destabilize space and place, social policy and criminology, separately and, more usefully, together, must focus much more on the ways in which state and semi-state agencies seek to restabilize localities “by the simultaneous integration and division of urban communities through a variety of social and penal policies” (Fitzpatrick, 2001, p. 213). His labelling of our work as part of the ‘adaptation school’ of social policy, accusing us of being reluctant, for professional reasons, to signal the imminent demise of the subject itself, appears ignorant of the fact that one of us, seventeen years ago, emphasised the ‘criminalisation of the discourses of social policy’ in the UK (Blagg et al, 1986; Stubbs, 1987). Nevertheless, we consider that the importance of new forms of territorialization of social control, in the West and in post-communist Central and South Eastern Europe, are highly relevant to the concerns of this conference. The attempt to follow Guy Standing’s concern with the forms of regulation of the
‘transgressing poor’ (Standing 2001), and the role of supranational and national agencies in these processes, would also have been a very useful additional emphasis within ‘Global Social Policy’.

3. **Active Welfare States**: The notion of an ‘active’ as opposed to a ‘passive’ welfare state has been particularly influential in some of the countries of South Eastern Europe (cf. Puljiz, 2001). In part, it derives from Giddens’ notion of ‘positive welfare’ (Giddens, 1994), as a corrective to a view of welfare as something provided by the state, increasingly contested and unsustainable in the context of new forms of risk, insecurity and the fundamental transformation of work. The importance of participation and, in particular, the involvement of new forms of ‘partnerships’ between state and non-state actors (cf. Giddens, 1998), is particularly resonant in post-communist societies, in the attempt to break down existing paternalistic social relations in the public sphere. Of course, Giddens’ grasp of the social politics of globalisation is extremely tenuous, and his ‘third way’ prescriptions risk being co-opted or coalesced into new forms of marketization. Nevertheless, the emphasis on the potential positive contribution of new social actors, and the importance of welfare as contributing to the creation and maintenance of autonomy, are points worthy of serious consideration. It is especially salutory to bear in mind that Giddens’ caution that there should be ‘no rights without responsibilities’ (Giddens, 1998, p. 68), was tempered with a resistance towards ‘compulsory participation’ and a restated emphasis on the vital role of redistribution to challenge material inequalities and injustices.

**GASPP and SEERC**

This is the intellectual backcloth to our contribution to this seminar that focuses on International Actors and the Making of Social Policy in South Eastern Europe. Through the Globalism and Social Policy Programme (GASPP, www.gaspp.org), we have continued to work on the relationship between political globalisation and welfare policy. Initially, we continued to work together on aspects of policy analysis in South Eastern Europe, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina (cf. Deacon and Stubbs, 1998). Since then, one of us (Deacon) has concentrated on global issues per se, whilst the other (Stubbs) has continued to focus on post-Yugoslav countries and South-Eastern Europe more generally.

Recently both of us came to be involved in helping to establish the new South East European Research Centre (SEERC, www.seerc.info) in Thessaloniki, Greece. This centre is a collaboration between the University of Sheffield in the UK and City College in Thessaloniki, and is ‘founded on the belief that by supporting the peoples, economies and political institutions of South Eastern Europe through the conduct of research and policy analysis … a significant contribution can be made to the development of a stronger, more stable and more prosperous European community.’

**This Paper**

This paper serves as a point of introduction for the sixth GASPP seminar, and the first in collaboration with SEERC, and the subsequent research agenda by:

- asking what is specific, interesting and different about the region of South Eastern Europe, both in general terms and with a particular focus on the role of international social policy actors,
• recapitulating what we think we know from previous scholarly work, including that of GASPP, about international actors and national social policy making (both in terms of the impact of such actors upon the CONTENT of social policy advice and in terms of how the PROCESS of international intervention impacts upon policy choices), and
• setting out a number of questions we hope this seminar and subsequent research might begin to provide answers to.

The longer term goal of this project of which this seminar is simply a first step is three-fold. Firstly, to test our existing theories of international policy interventions within this region; secondly, to amend them in the light of the special characteristics of the region and; and, thirdly, via further policy related seminars with government representatives and other stakeholders, try to influence the social policy agenda, in terms of content and process, by increasing the capacity of countries and their governments to own and make national social policy choices in the context of the complex of external international influences which they face.

II. Situating South Eastern Europe

Defining South Eastern Europe
The South-East European Research Centre goes beyond a focus on post-communist South Eastern Europe (the post-Yugoslav countries of Bosnia-Herzegovina; Croatia; the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; Serbia and Montenegro - including the UN-administered territory of Kosovo/a; and Slovenia; as well as Albania; Bulgaria and Romania) to also include Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. Any designation of this region of some 130 million people as a coherent entity, beyond mere geography, in terms of politics, culture, and so on, cannot be maintained for long. Indeed, the precise make-up of the individual nation states is, in some cases, contested. In particular the UN-administered province of Kosovo/a has a status in relation to Serbia and Montenegro which is uncertain. Indeed, the new state of Serbia and Montenegro, formerly the rump Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, is an uneasy alliance, with the smaller Montenegro having a degree of monetary, military and even political independence from its neighbour and partner. Whilst Bosnia-Herzegovina is a sovereign state, the powers of this state are much less than those of the entities and sub-entities which make it up. Cyprus remains divided and only the Greek Cypriot part is slated to join the European Union in 2004.

Economic Prosperity and Human Development
In terms of economic prosperity and human development, the region includes some relatively prosperous countries (Greece, Cyprus, and Slovenia); one middle income country (Croatia); and a number of low-to-middle income countries and poor countries. The Table below, based on figures from the UNDP Human Development Report 2003 (http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator) shows the range in terms of rankings of the Human Development Index (HDI); actual per capita GDP; GDP in terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP); the difference between GDP and HDI rankings (a positive value denotes a higher position in terms of the HDI, as is the case for all SEE countries except Turkey and Cyprus); and receipt of Official Development
Assistance (ODA), all for the year 2001. More extensive comparison between the countries is included in the paper by Despina Syrri.

There is now, of course, considerably more data on most of the post-Yugoslav countries than during and immediately after the wars of the Yugoslav succession. Nevertheless, data for Serbia and Montenegro and, in particular, for Kosovo/a, are still lacking. In addition, data for Bosnia-Herzegovina, a country where estimates of the population vary widely, should be treated with caution. A previous Human Development Report (HDR 2002), for example, actually estimated BiH’s HDI ranking as low as 99th. The figures for Overseas Development Assistance also need to be treated with extreme caution, but they show that, with the exception of Greece, all the countries in the region were recipients of ODA, in some cases quite considerable. A longer time-series would, perhaps, show a somewhat different picture, with BiH the largest single ODA recipient (for estimates of ODA to BiH over time see Papiæ, 2001), already declining in the context of donor fatigue and pessimism by 2001; and Serbia and Montenegro experiencing a sudden post-Milosevic injection of assistance around the same time.

Table 1: Indicators of Human and Economic Development and ODA, South-Eastern Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HDI Rank</th>
<th>GDP per capita USD</th>
<th>GDP per capita PPP USD</th>
<th>GDP-HDI Rank</th>
<th>ODA m. USD</th>
<th>ODA per capita USD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALBANIA</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>3680</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>268.9</td>
<td>86.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOSNIA-H</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>1175</td>
<td>5970</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>639.2</td>
<td>157.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BULGARIA</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>1690</td>
<td>6890</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>346.0</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CROATIA</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>4625</td>
<td>9170</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>112.5</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CYPRUS</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12004</td>
<td>21190</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>63.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREECE</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11063</td>
<td>17440</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACEDONIA</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1676</td>
<td>6110</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>247.7</td>
<td>121.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROMANIA</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1728</td>
<td>5830</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>647.7</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERBIA &amp; M</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1020</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1305.9</td>
<td>123.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLOVENIA</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>9443</td>
<td>17130</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>125.6</td>
<td>63.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TURKEY</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>2230</td>
<td>5890</td>
<td>-16</td>
<td>166.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Specificities of International Actors and the Making of Social Policy in SEE

From a policy analysis and research point of view the region we are talking about is very complex and rich. Some of the complexities, divergences and contradictions, can be set out in terms of the following four themes, all of which need to be elaborated upon further for the region as a whole and for the countries which make it up:

1. **Variable Relationships to an Indifferent European Union**: The countries of South Eastern Europe are very differently placed in terms of their relationship to the European Union which, in any case, shows a degree of indifference to issues of social policy in SEE. One country, Greece, has been a member since 1979, and held the Presidency from January to June 2003. Two countries, Slovenia and the Greek-Cypriot part of Cyprus, are scheduled to join the European Union in the largest single enlargement process in the EU’s history, on 1 May 2004. Two Candidate countries,
Bulgaria and Romania, originally hoped to join at the same time but failed to meet important criteria, in part relating to social issues. Both countries expect to join in 2007.

Turkey, involved in negotiations with the EU regarding membership for a long time, became a Candidate Country in 1999. Its current Accession partnership agreement suggests no timetable for membership and continues to place importance on a number of complex and, perhaps, difficult to implement, criteria. The other countries, former Yugoslavia except Slovenia and including Albania, as it were, are considered by the European Union as the ‘Western Balkans’. The process of integration of these countries into the European Union was given renewed impetus by the Greek Presidency of the EU culminating in the Thessaloniki summit of June 2003. Whilst regional co-operation is an important part of the criteria, it is recognised that each country should be treated on its merits, albeit in the framework of a Western Balkans Stabilisation and Association process. Croatia is the most advanced, having signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) in October 2001 and, on 21 February 2003, submitted a full application for membership. The opinion of the Commission on this application is expected in April 2004. Macedonia signed an SAA at the same time as Croatia and is expected to submit a full application soon. Albania, Serbia and Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina are involved in feasibility studies prior to the signing of an SAA.

In terms of social policy, this variable relationship matters, as it presents a variety of very different modalities and frameworks, all with their own particular problems. It is certainly the case that EU membership involves signing up to and realising in practice a somewhat limited set of legal social policy requirements: health and safety regulations, equal treatment of men and women, transferability of social security rights, and a system of social protection.

As the Greek case shows, of course, this leaves a lot of room for policy choice. At the level of rhetoric the EU in general, and DG5 in particular, exhorts the countries of the region to establish a social dimension to their market economies. In practice many authors (Deacon Hulse and Stubbs 1997, Ferge 2002, de la Porte and Pochet 2002, Vaughan-Whitehead 2002) have observed that there has been very limited influence from the EU on social policy. There have been exceptions to this, as in the negative opinions regarding Bulgaria and Romania with regard to children in institutions and street children, and more widely in terms of the question of the treatment of minorities where the EU has shown some teeth in the accession negotiations (Ferge 2002). This may prove to be an important issue, of course, in relation to SEE applicant countries in the context of concerns about human rights and, in particular, the rights of minorities.

It can be argued that, within the EU, the question of social policy has advanced further up the Commission agenda in recent years. The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) has now put in place the possibility of a concerted strategy for the modernisation of Social Protection in four areas: labour markets, the viability of pensions, high and sustainable levels of health care, and the promotion of the social integration of marginalised groups. The OMC involves peer review, a comparison of best practice, and is heavily reliant on guidelines and benchmarking. Hence, it is able to steer a path between being perceived as too restrictive by some member states or as
too permissive by the more vociferous proponents of a European social model. Clotouche (2001) of the Commission’s DG5 has argued that these four spheres of social protection belong to the ‘political’ or ‘soft’ acquis to be adopted by the candidate countries. In some contrast, Holzmann et al (2003) look to the OMC as a possible location for radical reform not so much of applicant countries but of the existing core EU members, particularly in terms of more privatisation in the social policy of countries such as Germany and France who may be influenced by the radical reform programmes of new EU members such as Hungary and Poland.

In any case, notwithstanding these debates, what appears to occur is that the Social Protection acquis are emphasised least for those countries which, perhaps, need them most, the poorest countries for whom EU membership is more distant. For many of these countries the EU’s external assistance agenda, and its various aid and reconstruction programmes, bear at best only a passing connection to the Social Protection acquis. Papers from Macedonia (Gerovska, 2003) and Croatia (Zrinšèak, 2003) at this conference demonstrate precisely this.

In short, the EU’s relationship to much of the region of South Eastern Europe is dominated, still, by a reconstruction and development agenda, heavily bureaucratised and delayed in its implementation, in which social policy concerns are rarely or haphazardly stressed. This is the case with the CARDS programme in the Western Balkans and appears to be the case within the specific context of the European Agency for Reconstruction which is responsible for the main EC assistance programmes in Serbia and Montenegro, Kosovo/a, and Macedonia. In a sense, this is a continuation and amplification of the problems associated with the PHARE programme for the first group of post-communist accession countries, amplified by the loss of a specific social policy audit process as was represented by the CONSENSUS programme (cf. de la Porte and Deacon, 2002). In this way, the EU and models of a social Europe are absent from centre stage in most of the key debates and technical assistance programmes regarding social policy in South Eastern Europe.

The proposal of the European Stability Initiative (ESI 2002) that the EU should develop a new policy instrument for structural intervention in the Western Balkans using the expertise gained in the earlier pre-accession programmes for the ten (earlier) candidate countries targeting policy areas such as social inclusion and employment seems far from being accepted. Such an approach would also allow countries of the region to begin to shadow EU processes such as the OMC. They argue that such an instrument should pull together the European Agency for Reconstruction, the EU pillar of UNMIK and the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Interestingly, the argument is based on the fact that disadvantage in the region is heavily territorialised, with many areas experiencing acute de-industrialisation, and lacking any tax base for social programmes. Hence, the argument that significant funding for regional programmes needs to be found is a very persuasive one, going beyond an orthodoxy on the importance of decentralisation in social policy.

2. The Hegemony of a World Bank Social Development Discourse. There are, at least, three broad trends and themes, over and above the ‘indifference’ of the EU, which work together to ensure that a World Bank-led social development discourse is becoming a dominant factor over-determining social policy choices in SEE. The first is that, having faced criticism from a range of quarters for its neo-liberal structural
adjustment policies, the World Bank globally has adapted in ways which accommodate aspects of the criticism but also expand its multi-mandated influence over all aspects of social development, including environmental issues, minority rights, gender, and so on. In addition, secondly, the setting of Millenium Development Goals have created a wider awareness of the importance of a renewed ‘co-ordinated poverty reduction’ regime (Stubbs, 2003), in which the World Bank has continued to be a key player. Thirdly, already noted above, many of the countries of the region are relatively poor compared to the EU, and some are absolutely poor. This impoverishment is a combination of historical factors, post-communist transition and, crucially, the wars of the Yugoslav succession destroying infrastructure, eroding human capital, and producing large-scale forced migrations of populations.

All of this means that the intellectual reference points and therefore the discourse of policy advocates working in the region is more complex than the clash between the EU and World Bank social policy discourses of universalism as opposed to selectivity, or regarding public versus private social provision. A social development discourse, more commonly found in developing countries, has now been applied to parts of South-Eastern Europe. In some of our earlier work, critical of the problems of humanitarianism and a crude psychologisation of the suffering as a result of the wars, we were ourselves calling for a more critical social development approach (cf Pećnik and Stubbs, 1995; Mimica and Stubbs, 1996). In retrospect, this gave far too much ground to a new kind of residual model of social policy, underpinned by a view that social safety-nets can be developed at local level, a regional re-working what Judith Tendler has termed the new orthodoxy of decentralization and participation’ (Tendler, 1997).

This is particularly important in terms of the development of Social Funds in some parts of the region and the formulation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes (PRSPs). The paper by Gerry Redmond (2003) makes a series of points about the problematic nature of PRSPs and the tendency for these to result in policies directed at targeting the poor for special relief and on facilitating small enterprise loans. They are less concerned with defending under-funded universal health and educational systems nor with universal child benefits or public pension systems. Indeed, the recent PRSP for Bosnia-Herzegovina seems to be a case in point, notwithstanding a belated attempt to integrate revised MDG targets (BiH, 2003). The paper is a crude attempt at ‘shock therapy’, advocating unrealistic marketization measures with no focus on social mitigation. Importantly, the neo-liberal economics underpinning it appears to be a product of local ownership by Bosnian experts as much as a result of the hegemony of World Bank thinking, with the latter arguing in some quarters that more not less needs to be spent on the social sector.

Whilst we do not have the research evidence to back up the claim, we suspect that the World Bank’s encounter with South Eastern Europe is a complex, contradictory and potentially transformative process, much as was its encounter with Central and Eastern Europe recounted in ‘Global Social Policy’. The World Bank does not prescribe one solution but, rather, different divisions of the Bank often appear to be developing divergent strategic goals. Hence, at same time as Holzmann et al from the Social Protection division of the World Bank concern themselves with pension reform, the Social Development Group of the Bank have responsibility for the Social Development Initiative for South East Europe (www.worldbank.org/eca/sdisee). A
part of this project, which we should hear more about at this conference, appears to be
the establishment of an Applied Social Research and Social Policy Network in South
East Europe funded by an Italian government grant of US$1 million and operating in
Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo/a. This aims to “build local capacity for social
scientists, policy makers and development practitioners to enhance their role as
interlocutors for Poverty Reduction Strategies, Country Assistance Strategies, social
assessments and project preparation” (ibid.). A cynic might argue that this is the Bank
training experts in its own image to introduce targeted social programmes much as
they trained a generation of Latin American pension experts.

It is fair to suggest that, in general terms, there is a disjuncture between the
intellectual and policy worlds of development specialists and those of European social
policy experts. The existence of the two paradigms in some ways reflects the
ambiguity of the EU towards the region as we discussed earlier. Is it a region on the
brink of rejoining Europe within which a social policy paradigm applies or is it a
region still in the throws of post-war crisis and underdevelopment within which a
development paradigm is fitting?

However even within the development context and challenging the Bank’s market
based approach to risk mitigation is the innovative work of the ILO’s Social and
Economic Security Programme (www.ilo.org/SES). Recognising the limitations of the
partial coverage of the formal social security systems in many countries, this work
seeks to develop new bottom up forms of universalism appropriate to the economic
level of development of the country. Sometimes these policy initiatives supported by
the ILO-SES team involve cash payments for school attendance (as in Brazil and
Indonesia), sometimes new universal pension schemes (as in Botswana and South
Africa). It is not clear at this stage whether the ILO’s East European Team (ILO-
CEET) that has responsibility for ILO policy interventions in much of this region is
trying to lend support to the partially universal PAYG Social Security Schemes or
whether it is experimenting in its advice with ideas emanating from the ILO-SES
work. In any case, rather like UNDP and, to an extent, UNICEF, both of which have
become more focused on projects than ideas, the ILO is not a major force able to
institutionalise and mainstream its social policy ideas in SEE, tending to focus
exclusively on labour market issues and tripartite dialogue.

Related to the above but distinguishable from it is the way in which the provision of
emergency relief by national and international donors in the context of the post-war
crises cuts across the continuation and restoration of normal social policy institutions
and mechanisms. In our studies of the development of social policy in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (Deacon and Stubbs 1998, Stubbs 2001), we have shown how relief
interventions have tended to operate through International and local NGOs, often sub-
contracted to provide services, thus forming a parallel system with little integration or
functional relationship to the well-established system of public services, including
Centres for Social Work (CSWs), with a fifty year history. These CSWs were,
sometimes, used as mere conduits for emergency aid and time-limited cash assistance
programmes, serving to undermine further their legitimacy.

Of course, throughout the region, there was an urgent need to diversify provision of
services and to secure a mixed model of welfare incorporating ‘new’ actors such as
associations of citizens, community-based organisations, local NGOs and, indeed, an
emerging private sector. The problem was that, within the dominant social development discourse, these actors were seen as, in and of themselves, more ‘progressive’, ‘responsive’, ‘rights-based’, and so on than the public sector, leading to a substantial erosion of the role of public provision, a resistance to planning and national direction, and a move towards a project-culture rather than needs-based provision.

3. A Proliferation of Actors Scrambling for Position

Quite apart from the World Bank, the EU, and the UN agencies including the ILO, the region is marked by a proliferation of actors, some of which are completely new and largely incomparable with any other bodies elsewhere, and all of which contribute, explicitly or implicitly, to a crowded arena of policy advice, project implementation, and strategic alliance-building in social policy.

At the regional level, the most important of these is the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, established at a meeting in Sarajevo in July 1999, as a co-ordinating body aiming to achieve “lasting peace, prosperity and stability for South Eastern Europe”. The Pact has a Special Co-ordinator in Brussels and works through a series of Working Tables and Initiatives. Originally conceived, in part at least, as a mechanism for pressuring change in Serbia, excluded until the change in regime, the Pact now combines a kind of moral entrepreneurship in which particular individuals and lobbyists can develop an agenda, with a recycling and diverting of funds, into what has been described as an ‘empty box’. It is certainly the case that some donor countries, particularly Germany and Austria, and some recipient countries, particularly those furthest away from EU membership, welcome this kind of approach whilst some other countries, and parts of the European Union, are increasingly sceptical.

After sustained lobbying by a range of actors, an Initiative for Social Cohesion (ISC) was established in 2000 within Working Table II on Economic Reconstruction, Development and Co-operation. Its overall objective is “to address social issues the affect the daily lives of citizens of the countries of SEE through regional approaches in the field of health, social protection, employment policy and vocational training, social dialogue and housing”. In a series of meetings in 2001, when the co-chairs were taken by the Governments of France and Serbia and Montenegro (then FRY), the main priorities for the coming years were: to improve health policy; strengthen social protection systems; develop social dialogue; enhance employability; stimulate new housing policies; and monitor and co-ordinate social policy development related projects (ISC, 2002). Leading roles are taken by the ILO, the Council of Europe, the European Trade Union Confederation, and the World Health Organisation, with funding from a range of donors, including most prominently Switzerland and the Council of Europe Bank.

In the absence of representative from the ISC at this seminar, it is perhaps noteworthy that its lofty aims are by no means matched by its funding, itself skewed towards health issues including food safety, communicable diseases, and mental health, nor does it have any presence or impact outside of a small circle of cogniscenti. Interestingly, under the French co-chairpersonship, now ended, a series of regional meetings were held very much within a developed country social policy paradigm. (www.stabilitypact.org/stabilitypactcgi). A regional meeting held on 4-5 November
2002 sponsored by the ILO, the Ministry of Labour of Slovenia, the Ministry of Social Affairs of France and the Council of Europe addressed the reforms needed to underpin existing state pension schemes and noted that “in countries without developed financial markets or expertise in their regulation, pension privatisation would likely result in high administrative costs and low investment yields, worsening workers’ prospects for retirement”. It remains to be seen what influence the ISC can have on an agenda for social policy and social protection in SEE.

In addition, in both Bosnia-Herzegovina, through the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and in Kosovo/a, through the UN-administration (UNMIK), as well as through Nato-led peace-keeping missions (SFOR and KFOR), a new kind of ad hoc protectorate governance exists. Interestingly, whilst in BiH a vary low emphasis was placed on social policy issues, this was not the case later in Kosovo/a. In part because of the involvement of the UK Government’s Department for International Development (DFID), there was a great deal of attention to social welfare and its reform, including the strengthening of both Centres for Social Work and the graduate training in social policy and social work. Indeed, in the region as a whole, DFID has been a key player both in terms of seeking to influence, in part through leverage of funding, the World Bank’s technical assistance programmes, as well as through pilot partnership projects in certain localities in both BiH and Serbia. The role of other bilateral donors, including Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands, has also impacted on social policy assistance, sometimes in quite unexpected ways.

What this adds up to is a bewildering array of international actors and their representatives, some of whom wear more than one face, all competing to shape the social policy of the region. This can leave the country social affairs ministries confused and disempowered, or it can simply multiply policy uncertainty as one approach and funding is simply replaced by another. Indeed, it is not unknown for different donors to be working with different ministries on similar themes, from divergent perspectives, at the same time. Within the region there are emerging initiatives that might be designed to regain the policy initiative, including the South East Europe Co-ordinating Process and a possible future SEEFTA. However, it seems unlikely that a regional approach to social policy led by the region will be established in the future with a redistribution, regulations and rights agenda paralleling those of the EU.

4. Specific Internal Factors Contribute to Social Policy Complexities

In this paper, there is insufficient space to explore in detail the internal factors in the countries and territories of South-Eastern Europe which pose particular questions for the making of social policy. Here we can note only four which all, in their different ways, make the region somewhat complex and problematic in terms of a study of the role of international actors.

The first of these is the multi-faith and multi-cultural nature of the region as a meeting point of Catholic, Orthodox and diverse Muslim traditions. Within Europe we know that certain kinds of welfare regime/institutional arrangements are more open to the influence of neo-liberal and other forms of modernist social policy thinking than others. The UK, always a mixed liberal-universal regime goes with the flow of neo-liberalism. Social democratic Scandinavia has been sustained despite neo-liberal pressures. The more problematic cases are Germany, France and other conservative
corporatist welfare states which have been most challenged by economic globalisation (in terms of the high cost of labour taxes) but most resistant to change (because of the high trade union commitment to the existing institutional arrangements). Post-communist Eastern European countries in the first wave of EU accession countries are emerging as stuck somewhere between Europe and the USA with institutional features of Conservative Corporatism (the logical conversion of the old work–based welfare states into Bimarkian welfare states) overlaid with neo-liberal policy initiatives.

Now the SEE region presents us with not only the Catholic and Bismarkian inclined but liberal influenced Croatia (a ‘familiar’ story) but also Orthodox (and Bismarkian inclined?) Serbia, Macedonia, and Bulgaria, and an Islamic influenced Turkey, Albania and parts of Bosnia-Herzogivina. In which of these contexts will neo-liberal social policy ideas fly? Which are most resistant? What other traditions of social policy associated with Islam and with Orthodoxy should be put into the explanatory framework? Do confessions matter at all? Is modernisation of social policy seen as an escape from confessional pasts? All we can say with certainty is that the importance of religious and cultural factors in the process of transition and adaptation of welfare regimes is a complex question which, in our view, in under-researched in South Eastern Europe.

The second, related, issue is the ethnicisation of social life in much of the region, through wars, forced migrations and the interest of one state in contiguous diasporas elsewhere. One finds, therefore, a clustering of ethnicised questions in Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia; but also in Albania, Macedonia, Greece and Turkey. Our normal focus in other words on the development of collective social rights and duties (the stuff of social policy) seemed to be lending support to collective but ethnicised claims. Now it might be suggested that this ethnic exclusivity is ‘normal’ and was the story of the development of social rights in even the most advanced social democratic states of Europe (the ‘people’s home) and is a stage of historical development which is only now giving way to the realities of complex multicultural and multi-identity ‘societies’. Dimitrijevic (1997), for example, has argued that the focus of social policy should be on individual rather than collective rights. Certainly a rights-based approach to social policy has been a key feature of the discourse about social entitlements in the context of developing countries so much so that even the World Bank has now a working party addressing how it might inject a rights based approach into its development discourse. Any analysis and proscription for social policy in SEE may will need to address the use of this approach in furthering claims to social protection.

The role of a variety of state and sub-state agencies in reproducing exclusionary practices which cut across traditional citizenship–based claims to social rights is an important phenomenon throughout the region. In addition, the fate of the Roma in South Eastern Europe, clearly over-represented in parts of the social control elements of welfare such as children’s homes and juvenile justice institutions, also gives cause for concern (cf Carter, 2001). In Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, we pointed to simultaneous processes of international agencies ‘playing down’ and ‘playing up’ these realities in their attempts either to ‘normalise’ social policy or to focus on human rights violations (Stubbs, 2001). The role of religious international
organisations, including various Saudia Arabian organisations, as well as Caritas and the International Orthodox Christian Charities is also under studied.

Thirdly, wider diasporization is clearly a factor which, serves to derritorialise social policy in parts of South Eastern Europe. The fact that many areas of South Eastern Europe have large numbers of persons who feel connected to the locality and/or nation state, but who are resident abroad, and who send remittances home, is relevant for social policy, not only in terms of the need to account for this in studies of household income, poverty and inequality. In addition, the role of these diasporas in wider politics and, sometimes, as mediators in a variety of international agencies, is also a phenomenon which has been remarked upon, but very little studied.

Fourthly, the presence of what we somewhat controversially, although influentially, following Katherine Verdery (1996), termed ‘neo-feudal’ structures is also relevant to the making of social policy (cf. Bazzocchi, 2002). Certainly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Albania, in Kosovo/a, to an extent in Serbia and Montenegro and Macedonia, and perhaps in Romania, where Verdery developed the concept, the concentration of power locally rather than centrally, through a circularity of elites in politics, business, and in some cases in organised crime, working through patronage and influence peddling, is relevant in terms of the need for international agencies to find counterparts and partners for their projects. Again, this is an under-researched issue in the making of social policy in SEE, relating to the territorialisation of social control and the extra-institutional nature of welfare in parts of the region.

III. Globalisation and SEE Social Policy: Questions of Content

Elsewhere (Deacon, 2003), we have summarised what we now believe to be the way in which globalisation is impacting upon the making of national social policy. This section recapitulates that argument and puts forward some tentative hypotheses regarding the content of social policy in South Eastern Europe. A key question is whether, as is often presumed, the globalisation process influences or indeed determines for countries what their social policies are. Does globalisation limit the social policy choices available to governments wherever they are?

In general terms we have suggested that globalisation:

- Sets welfare states in competition with each other. This raises the spectre but not the certainty of a race to the welfare bottom. It raises the question as to what type of social policy best suits competitiveness without undermining social solidarity.
- Brings new players into the making of Social Policy. International organisations such as the IMF, World Bank, WTO and UN agencies such as WHO, ILO etc have become involved in prescribing country policy. Also relevant are regional organisations such as MERCOSUR, ASEAN, SADC etc. International NGOs have often substituted for government in this context.
- Generates a global discourse about best social policy. Because supranational actors have become involved the traditional within-country politics of welfare has taken on a global dimension with a struggle of ideas being waged within and between IOs as to desirable social policy. The battle for pension policy in
post-communist countries between the Bank and the ILO was a classic example. (Deacon, Hulse and Stubbs 1997)

- Creates a global private market in social provision. Increased free trade has created the possibility of mainly USA and European private health care and hospital providers, education providers, social care agencies and social insurance companies benefiting from an international middle class market in private social provision.

When we began the GASPP project there was a worry among those concerned with universal social provisioning as part of the struggle for social equity that these factors would push social policy in all countries in a residual neo-liberal direction. In other words there was a worry that the neo-liberal character of globalisation would determine that social policy took on a neo-liberal character too (Mishra 1999). These fears have been partly allayed. In terms of the actual impact of economic globalisation upon social policy in more northern and more developed economies a new scholarly consensus is emerging. Elements of this argument and research evidence include the following:

- Globalization does not necessarily have to lead to the residualisation (and privatisation) of social provision. In the north there are arguments and experiences that show that redistributive social policy with high levels of income taxation and high levels of public health, education and social security are sustainable in the face of global competition. In a comparative survey of Anglo-Saxon (UK) Conservative Corporatist (Germany) and Social Democratic (Sweden) welfare states both the neo-liberal and social democratic approaches remained competitive. The neo-liberal approach, of course, risked creating increased inequity that compensatory social policy such as tax credits seeks to minimise. The most challenged were work-based welfare states funded on the basis of labour taxes with locked in inflexible labour contracts for industrial workers. So long as revenue for social provision was raised from citizens rather than capital, and providing service jobs are high quality public ones, then high level universal social provision is sustainable and does not undermine competitiveness and full employment. (Scharfe 2000, Sykes et al 2001, Swank 2002).

- At the same time the fears of social dumping in the south have been shown to be exaggerated (Alber and Standing 2000). Moreover evidence from a recent global survey of the impact of globalization upon economies has shown that some governments in the south have chosen to increase their social spending during liberalization (Taylor, 2000).

- Moreover it is now recognized internationally that globalization and openness of economies generates the need for more not less attention to social protection measures (OECD, 1999).

- A response to globalization in some middle-income countries has indeed been to create universalistic forms of social policy. A good example is Korea (Huck-Ju Kwon, 2001).

- Some of the social policy responses adopted in Latin America and elsewhere in the hey-day of the Washington neo-liberal consensus such as the full privatisation of pension schemes are now being shown by comparative policy analysts to have questionable advantages in terms of net savings effects and other criteria (Mesa-Lago, 2000 and Huber and Stephens, 2000). Mesa-Lago
shows that neither old-fashioned state socialism (Cuba) nor new-fashioned neo-liberalism (Chile) but socially regulated capitalism (Costa Rica) does best economically and socially.

This is reassuring but despite this evidence one of us has argued (Deacon 2000) that certain tendencies in the globalisation process and certain policy positions adopted by international organisations still give cause for concern especially with regard to social policy in more southern and more underdeveloped economies. This is examined below.

Today we are not confronted by a global neo-liberal Washington consensus where belief in an unregulated market reigns supreme. The dominant global discourse has shifted from a socially irresponsible neo-liberal globalisation to one that expresses concern about global poverty. A “socially responsible” globalisation discourse and practice has replaced the earlier one. It has had to because of the global social movements against the neo-liberal form of globalisation. This new consensus is not a truly global consensus. Many social movements in the south would not subscribe to it.

Our concern with this emerging consensus is that despite the apparent shift from global neo-liberalism to global social responsibility the coexistence of four tendencies within the new global paradigm, if allowed to be pursued, will still undermine an equitable approach to social policy and social development. These tendencies are

- The World Bank’s continuing belief that governments should only provide minimal or basic levels of social provision and social protection.
- The OECD’s Development Assistance Committee’s concern to fund only basic education and health care within its new international development targets.
- The International NGOs’ continuing self interest in winning donor contracts to substitute for government social services
- The moves being made within the WTO to speed up the global market in private health, social care, education and insurance services

Our concern is the following. Where the state provides only minimal and basic level health and social protection services, the middle classes of developing and transition economies will be enticed into the purchase of private social security schemes, private secondary and tertiary education and private hospital level medical care that are increasingly being offered on a cross border or foreign investment presence basis. The result is predictable. We know that services for the poor are poor services. We know that those developed countries that do not have universal public health provision at all levels and public education provision at all levels are not only more unequal but also more unsafe and crime ridden. Unless the middle class are also catered for by state provision good quality social provision cannot be sustained. This is the prospect for many countries that buy into this new development paradigm.

Social Policy in SEE
Research is urgently needed into the welfare strategies now being adopted by the middle class in the countries of South Eastern Europe. We know that the shocks of transition and, in many countries war, have produced ‘hour glass societies’ in which the middle-class has been eroded and impoverished, in the context of a small but highly visible new rich. In addition, there has been flight away from the public sector
by a generation of workers who have now founded NGOs, often funded from abroad, further contributing to an erosion of public services. In addition, marketization of health, education, and to an extent social services, including informal marketization through bribes and under the counter payments, are also a factor structuring unequal provision in SEE.

Mihail Arandarenko’s paper (Arandarenko, 2004) focuses on the issue of labour market reform and the strong disconnect between advice and evidence-based impacts. In addition, the question of de-institutionalisation, particularly in terms of children in care but also adults with disabilities, is a crucial question for system reform (cf. Bosnjak 2002). In this respect a collaboration between UNICEF and the World Bank on the ‘Changing Policies, Changing Lives’ initiative is another example of a surprising alliance and a new multi-mandated additional area of concern for the World Bank, traditionally not particularly focused on what be seen as the ‘softer’ elements of social services and social work, beyond the issue of cash benefits and social transfers.

The role of some international actors in promoting the building of new institutional care facilities, and increasing pressures for international adoption, sometimes in contravention of international conventions, is also worthy of more study.

In particular, the whole issue of the governance of social welfare, the design, delivery and management of services, including the use and resistance to the use of standards and benchmarking, in the context of a theme-based project culture in social welfare, is relevant in terms of the influence and impact of external actors. Finally, what is the role of these actors in encouraging or limiting a move from paternalistic approaches to community-based and user-led services. Of course, issues of voice justice must explore questions of age, gender, ethnicity and other forms of exclusion.

IV. Globalisation and SEE Social Policy: Questions of Process

So far we have focussed upon formal international organisations and institutions and the explicit social policies of these organisations in an attempt to understand something about globalisation and international social policy making. This is to examine only part of the story. At the global level, we may be witnessing a shift in the locus and content of policy debate and activity from those more formally located within the official UN policy making arenas (whether of ECOSOC in New York, the councils of the ILO and WHO in Geneva, or the IMF and World Bank in Washington) to a set of practices around Networks, Partnerships and Projects which in some ways bypass these institutions and debates and present new possibilities for actually making global change in particular social policy arenas, pose new questions for issues of transparency and accountability, and certainly impact upon the social policy choices of countries.

In an edited collection on ‘Governing Globalization’, Ngaire Woods argues:

“The global governance debate is focussed heavily on the reform and creation of international institutions….yet global governance is increasingly being undertaken by a variety of networks, coalitions and informal arrangements which lie a little further beyond the public gaze and direct control of governments. It is these forms of
governance that need sustained and focussed attention to bring to light whose interests they further and to whom they are accountable” (Woods, 2002).

Among examples of these networks, partnerships and projects are the UN Secretary General’s Millennium Project involving ten task forces to manage the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals. The essence of this emerging networking and partnership form of policy development and practice-shifting through a focus on specific projects is the collaboration between stakeholders in the international organisations, the global corporate sector, international NGOs and civil society organisations. Such a shift in the locus and substance of global policy-making and practice has received support recently from commentators coming from very different intellectual positions. Rischard (2002), The World Bank’s Vice President for Europe in ‘High Noon: 20 Global Issues and 20 Years to Solve Them’ argues that global multilateral institutions are not able to handle global issues on their own, that treaties and conventions are too slow for burning issues, that intergovernmental conferences do not have adequate follow up mechanisms, and that the G7/8 type groupings are too exclusive. Instead what is needed are Global Issues Networks (GINs) involving governments, civil society, and business facilitated by a lead multilateral organisation who create a rough consensus about the problem to be solved and the task to be achieved, establish norms and practice recommendations and then report on failing governments and encourage good practice through knowledge exchange and a global observatory which feeds a name and shame approach.

Charlotte Streck (2002), focusing on environmental policy, argues similarly for Global Public Policy Networks (GPPNs) which bring together governments, the private sector and civil society organisations. She insists that recent trends in international governance indicate that the focus has shifted from intergovernmental activity to multi-sectoral initiatives; and from a largely formal legalistic approach to a less formal participatory and integrated approach. Such GPPNs can agenda-set, standard-set, generate and disseminate knowledge and bolster institutional effectiveness. Streck is building here on the work of Réinicke and Bennet (2000) who argued that International Organisations had a particular role they could play in GPPNs as convenor, platform, net-worker and sometimes partial financier (cf. also www.gppi.net).

Global policy-making may have become “projectised” and task centred. A key question is how intervention in these tasks and projects might be anything other than opportunistic or self-interested or pragmatic. Because so much of this kind of work is subcontracted in terms of its intellectual and policy content and in terms of implementation principles that guide these actors become important. Often important players in these international policy networks are International Non-Governmental Organisations such as OXFAM, Christian AID working with multi-lateral organisations such as the UN agencies and the departments of international development of bilateral donors such as UKDFID or USAID.

INGOs have come to assume importance within the global social policy making process both in the sense of being policy advocates often on the side of the angels arguing for improved international and national commitments to welfare but also in the sense paradoxically, of being agents for the delivery of aid and hence often substituting for government welfare provision. One of us (Stubbs 2003) has described
these actors as intermediate organisations falling between genuine civil society organisations and formal intergovernmental organisations. They are important not only for their policy influence and service provision but also because their presence in a country can distort the actual delivery of welfare in unintended ways. The higher pay of the INGO workers distorts the local labour market and undermines lower paid public civil servants.

INGOs are then part of the welfare mix that makes up the agents of welfare provision and policy in most countries in the context of globalisation. The table below extends welfare regime analysis, with its traditional focus on social policy within one country, which sees welfare as produced and allocated in and through the inter-relationships of the state, the market, community and households, to encompass the role of global, supra-national, transnational or international actors alongside that of domestic actors.

**TABLE 2: The Extended Welfare Mix**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Domestic</th>
<th>Supra-national</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>1. Domestic governance</td>
<td>5. International org’s, national donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>3. Civil Society, NGOs</td>
<td>7. International NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household</td>
<td>4. Households</td>
<td>8. International household strategies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For our purposes here, the sixth and seventh categories in the matrix, those of Supra-National Markets (Global Markets and MNCs), and Supra-National Community (INGOs), are of greatest interest. These two components could be aggregated as a kind of Global Intermediate Category between the Global Public (IGO and donors), and the Global Household or Global Private (international household strategies, including remittances home by diaspora). At the global level they are the correlates of those national actors which are neither fully public (as is the state) nor fully private (as is the household). This is represented in Table 3.

These intermediate actors operate at several levels:
- they seek to influence international organizations directly through international lobbying;
- they seek to influence the governments of the advanced industrial states to change their policies;
- they operate in the developing and transition countries in a lobbying capacity;
- they also actually provide services.

**TABLE 3: The Extended Welfare Mix: the intermediate sphere**

|                | Domestic                      | Supra-national                |

1 (Gough, 2001: 169); numbers of matrix entries added.
This gives us much greater insight into the ‘who’ of social policy making which, in some path dependency uses of the extended welfare mix notion, is too often confused with the ‘what’, or content questions. In terms of the ‘how’, the importance of sub-contracting and the continued hegemony of the new public management amongst all actors, which has been described as the ‘little brother’ of neo-liberal economics (Voipio, 2003), cannot be underestimated. Hence, global social policy making cannot be understood without taking account of both International Networks around specific policy issues or without taking account of the role played by intermediate organisations such as INGOs and Consulting Companies within the international social welfare matrix. In this way, advice becomes a strange sort of unpredictable commodity, always best understood through ethnographic or anthropological approaches, and often less about content than a process of technicisation, and a celebration of form and slickness (cf Gould, 2003; de la Porte and Deacon, 2001).

Processes of Social Policy Making in SEE
The use of sub-contracting procedures by the World Bank, by the European Union and by UK DFID globally, and particularly in South Eastern Europe, should be considered as a case study in the relationship between local memories and international advice regimes (cf Stubbs, 2002). Certainly, thus far, programmes of ‘technical assistance’ have tended to disempower and marginalise local capacity, expertise and analyses (an example of this regarding Croatia, in which one of us was involved directly, is provided by Zrinšèak). In addition, process issues are rarely directly considered within the consultancy mode itself, in part because of its short-term nature. Of course, the reality is more complex and involves the role of mediators, the prioritising of particular discourses, financial and economic often, over others, more socially oriented, perhaps. Hence, the need to reassess technical assistance programmes in SEE is somewhat urgent.

Going beyond questions of social policy, the critique of international support policies to Bosnia (Papiæ et al, 2001) has a wider relevance to South Eastern Europe in terms of the importance of a process of aid and development assistance being assessed by the recipients of that assistance. The paper from Papiae elaborates on this, reinforcing the idea of the need “to engage international organisations to enable on-going critical evaluation of the totality of their activities in given countries”. Gerovska’s call for an observatory to monitor, analyse and adjust the recommendations of international agencies should also be taken seriously within South Eastern Europe as a whole.
V: Conclusions: Future Research and Policy Agendas

All of this is to suggest that the issue of social policy making in SEE is ripe for a collaborative study of the actions of international actors, sensitive to theories, methods and politics, and seeking to address the who, the what, and the how, of social policy making.

A number of obvious questions arise from all of the above for this seminar and for subsequent research. Some of these include:

How variable have been and are the social policy choices being made by different countries in the spheres of social protection, social services, health and education? Where and why have certain international actors been influential?

How does the ‘normal’ EU/WB social policy discourse and disagreement about desirable national social policy get cut across by the World Bank’s and the EU’s Social Development discourse applied to this region? What are the implications for the existence of the social development discourse for propositions about content of national social policy?

Are the Aid processes that were related to the post-conflict situations of the wars of Yugoslav succession consistent with social policy making in normal times, and if not how might countries now be enabled to own subsequent social policy making consistent with future European membership?

Do International Organisations and International NGO interventions enrich the national policy debate and empower local actors or do they disempower them and become substitutes for normal politics?

What special social policy influences has the Stability Pact had? How will these become normalised?

What evidence is there of the emergence of cross border private provision in health, education and social protection and social services and what is the likely impact upon any attempt to (re)construct universal national welfare entitlements?

What influences are the different confessional practices in the region having upon the emerging forms of social provision? Are there examples in the region of expressions of cross border solidarities of a religious or ethnic kind and how are these impacting upon national secular social provision?

What are the roles of different bilateral agencies in the making of social policy in the region? Are there different impacts of different bilaterals in different parts of the region?

How are the relationships between economic and social policies considered in different parts of SEE? How do international actors influence notions of scale, and of access and voice in social policy?
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